Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Fall 2019

Article 5

December 2019

Extraterritoriality in Common Law Climate Actions: Judicial
Restraint or Judicial Error?
Aaron B. Rudyan
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Common Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aaron B. Rudyan, Extraterritoriality in Common Law Climate Actions: Judicial Restraint or
Judicial Error?, 37 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2019)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

NOTE
Extraterritoriality in Common Law Climate
Actions: Judicial Restraint or Judicial Error?
AARON B. RUDYAN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................................................ 179
II. Background of the Common Law Climate Actions .............. 182
III. Extraterritorial Application of the Common Law ............ 185
A. The Hesitation to Establish a New Field of Federal Common
Law ............................................................................................. 185
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply
to Common Law Nuisance Suits ............................................... 189
1. The Common Law as “Common,” “Constrained” and the
Law of the “Commoner” ......................................................... 191
2. Climate Nuisance Suits as “Common,” “Constrained,” and
the Law of the “Commoner” ................................................... 194
IV.
Choice-of-Law Principles Dictate the Use of U.S. Law in
Climate Nuisance Suits................................................................. 198
A. Federal Common Law ......................................................... 198
1. Maintaining the International System ............................. 200
2. Relevant Policies and Interests of Each Sovereign Nation
201
3. Ease in Applying U.S. Law ............................................... 202
B. State Common Law ............................................................ 203
1. California............................................................................ 203
2. New York............................................................................. 206
C. The Choice-of-Law Analyses Further Support the
Extraterritorial Application of the Common Law in Climate
Actions. ....................................................................................... 207
J.D. Candidate, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, 2021; M.E.M.
Candidate, Yale F&ES, 2021. I thank Professor Katrina Kuh, Allison Fausner,
and the entire PELR board for their insightful comments and editorial assistance.
Many thanks as well to my friends and family for their support and
encouragement.
*

177

1

178
V.

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Conclusion .............................................................................. 208

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5

2

2019]
I.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CLIMATE ACTIONS

179

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, the United States (“U.S.”) signed and ratified the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”).1 Under the UNFCCC, the U.S. is required, among
other obligations, to (1) implement measures to mitigate climate
change by addressing anthropogenic sources of emissions; 2 (2)
promote practices and processes that reduce or prevent emissions
from all sectors;3 (3) promote sustainable management of sinks and
reservoirs;4 (4) include climate change considerations in relevant
social, economic, and environmental policies;5 (5) adopt policies to
mitigate climate change by limiting emissions of greenhouse gases
and by protecting sinks and reservoirs, with the aim of returning
to 1990 emissions levels by 2000;6 and (6) identify and review
domestic policies which encourage increased emissions of
greenhouse gases.7 In 2016, the U.S. furthered its intent to
mitigate climate change by signing the Paris Climate Agreement,
whereby the U.S. pledged to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by
26-28% below the 2005 level before 2025.8
Despite the growing understanding of the near- and long-term
effects of climate change,9 the U.S. has struggled to meet its goals
under the Paris Agreement because, at the federal level, the
political branches of government have neglected to adopt adequate

1. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 26, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Climate Change Framework].
2. Id. at art. 4(1)(b).
3. Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
4. Id. at art. 4(1)(d).
5. Id. at art. 4(1)(f).
6. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)–(b).
7. Id. at art. 4(2)(e)(ii).
8. U.S., U.S.A. FIRST N.D.C. SUBMISSION 1 (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States
%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FLB7-9G2Q].
9. See Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming
of 1.5°C, IPCC (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-forpolicymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-bygovernments/ [https://perma.cc/A6HQ-FG4T] (determining that the severe
impacts of climate change are already occurring and will exponentially increase
if no action is taken).
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climate laws.10 The U.S. Congress, for example, has failed to adopt
any law to specifically control greenhouse gas emissions. 11
Likewise, the Executive Branch has demonstrated shortcomings in
adopting climate-related initiatives. Although President Obama
attempted to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction through
the Clean Power Plan, the courts have stayed this initiative,12 and
after the current administration took office in 2016, President
Trump has effectively withdrawn support for the Plan,13
implemented policies to support continued reliance on fossil-fuel
sources of energy,14 and officially started the proceedings to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement.15 Due to the difficulties of
implementing global climate policies and inaction at the federal
level, an overarching legal regime to limit greenhouse gas
emissions appears unachievable. And, despite the growing trend
toward abating climate change at the state and local levels,16
10. See generally Congress Climate History, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climate-history/
[https://perma.cc/7NK9-AX2H]; see also Rep. of U.N. Env’t Programme, Emissions
Gap Report 2018, at 9, 15, U.N. Doc. DEW/2210/NA (2018).
11. See Congress Climate History, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.).
Five separate but identical orders were issued in response to five separate
applications to stay and many scholars have questioned the Court’s authority to
stay the case due to the stay’s unprecedented nature. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling,
The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 426
(2016); Joshua Linn et. al., The Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan:
Economic Assessment and Implications for the Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10859, 10860 (2016).
13. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093–97 (Mar. 31,
2017) (replacing the Clean Power Plan with a fossil-fuel friendly initiative); see
also Brad Plumer, What to Expect as U.S. Leaves Paris Climate Accord, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/us-parisaccord-what-happens-next.html [https://perma.cc/5CNS-G5AW] (explaining the
national and international repercussions of Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement).
14. See Proposal: Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-cleanenergy-ace-rule [https://perma.cc/ZXZ9-AAKU] (last updated June 19, 2019)
(describing the fossil-fuel friendly regulation which has been promulgated under
President Trump’s first term).
15. Drew Kann, US Begins Formal Withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord,
CNN (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/04/politics/trump-formalwithdrawal-paris-climate-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/E9ZG-ECTM].
16. See generally ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, MAYORS LEADING THE
WAY ON CLIMATE: HOW CITIES LARGE AND SMALL ARE TAKING ACTION 9–20 (2018),
http://www.usmayors.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/uscm-2018-alliance-
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climate initiatives foresee stabilization of global surface
temperatures in the distant future, if at all. As a result, many
jurisdictions, including cities, are currently experiencing the
negative effects of climate change with no reasonable prospect for
political redress.17
Cities, therefore, have turned to judicial tribunals to obtain
relief. Numerous cities within the U.S. have brought actions in
federal courts across the nation seeking damages caused by climate
change through the legal lens of common law torts. 18 Originally,
cities sought to bring actions against the major greenhouse gas
emitters under the legal regime of the federal common law. 19 In
2011, however, the Supreme Court determined that these claims,
with respect to defendants deemed domestic corporations, were
displaced under the Clean Air Act. 20 Consequently, cities have
begun litigating climate actions against the oil companies who
provide the fossil fuels used to produce greenhouse gases under
state common law.21 Despite the high volume of climate actions
entering the judicial system, almost all are being dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, without any discussion of the merits of their
claims.22
This Note delves into two of these common law nuisance
actions in which district courts dismissed the City of Oakland’s and
the City of New York’s claims that foreign and domestic oil
companies caused city-wide damages by exacerbating the changing

building-report-baldwin-small-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4QW-N8AQ]; see also
John R. Nolon, Low Carbon Land Use: Paris, Pittsburgh, and the IPCC, 40 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 661, 678–91 (2018).
17. ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 16, at 8.
18. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 7, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.
Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No: 2:18-CV-182-JFK) [hereinafter New York Am.
Compl.]; First Amended Complaint at 2, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.
Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No: 3:17-CV-06011-WHA) [hereinafter Oakland
Am. Compl].
19. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011).
20. Id. at 424.
21. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 7; Oakland Am. Compl., supra
note 18, at 2.
22. See R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate
Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 322
(2017) (illustrating the judiciary’s “subterfuge and self-limitation” with respect to
adjudicating the substantive claims of climate change plaintiffs).
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climate system through their continuous sale of fossil fuels.23
Instead of targeting the dismissal of domestic oil companies, where
the current legal debate revolves around Clean Air Act preemption
and displacement,24 this Note focuses on the dismissal of the
claims with respect to foreign oil companies. Part II introduces the
two climate nuisance suits and the district courts’ reasoning in
dismissing the common law complaints against the domestic and
foreign defendants. Part III then illustrates that the courts
erroneously relied on statutory canons to analyze and dismiss the
cities’ common law claims as they pertain to foreign defendants.
Specifically, this section discusses the district courts’ misuse of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to dismiss the common law
claims against the foreign oil companies. The final jurisdictional
hurdle that the courts must overcome before reviewing the
allegations on their merits is determining which law applies,
domestic law or foreign law. Therefore, Part IV explores the novel
choice-of-law analysis in the context of climate nuisance actions
and concludes that both federal and state choice-of-law principles
dictate the use of U.S. law – whether state or federal – in the
context of common law climate actions. This section concludes with
the exploration of how the choice-of-law analyses further support
the extraterritorial application of the common law.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE COMMON LAW
CLIMATE ACTIONS

In 2018, two novel common law climate actions were brought
in the District Court for the Northern District of California and the
District Court for the Southern District of New York.25 In both
cases, the cities of Oakland and New York brought public nuisance
actions against domestic and foreign oil companies for causing city-

23. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
24. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims
and Climate Change Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 69 (2018).
25. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1 (naming BP, Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants); Oakland Am.
Compl., supra note 18, at 1 (naming BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil,
and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants).
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wide damages as a result of their contributions to climate change.26
Through their lawsuits, the cities attempted to expand upon the
jurisprudence of transboundary harm27 by arguing for the
extraterritorial application of recognized common law principles to
hold foreign and domestic oil companies liable for localized
damages caused by climate change.28 In both cases, the cities
originally sought relief under the state common law.29 Both district
courts, however, determined that the suits must be governed by
federal common law because the climate nuisance claims are
entrenched in transboundary emissions. 30 State common law
cannot apply, the courts reasoned, because controlling interstate
pollution is a matter of federal law.31 Thus, “our federal system
does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law . . .
because the interstate or international nature of the controversy
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”32
Subsequently, the district courts easily dismissed the public
nuisance claims against the domestic oil companies based on the
Clean Air Act’s displacement of federal common law nuisance suits
26. Three of these oil companies – Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil
– are domestic oil companies, while the other two – BP and Royal Dutch Shell –
are foreign-based. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 17 at 8–9.
27. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907) (applying
common law principles to interstate pollution emitted from a finite copper
refinery); see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906) (applying common
law principles to interstate pollution discharged from a discrete sewage channel).
28. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1–2; Oakland Am. Compl., supra
note 18, at 4–5.
29. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1; Oakland Am. Compl., supra
note 18, at 2.
30. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
Order Denying Motions to Remand at 3, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.
Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No: 3:17-CV-06011-WHA). Currently, both cities
have appealed this determination to the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit,
respectively. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 29–42, City of New York v. BP P.L.C.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 18-2188) [hereinafter Appellant Brief].
Instead of taking a position on this complex, article-worthy topic, this Note argues
that in either situation the governing common law can apply extraterritorially.
While other sources discuss the implications of preemption jurisprudence, this
Note will not. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, Climate Change Litigation in the Federal
Courts: Jurisdictional Lessons from California v. BP, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE
25, 26 (2018).
31. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987); see also Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (“When we deal with air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law . . . .”).
32. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
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involving emissions of greenhouse gas. 33 Because the Clean Air Act
only grants the EPA jurisdiction over regulating domestic
greenhouse gas emissions,34 the district courts were unable to use
the same displacement principles to dismiss the action against the
foreign oil companies.35 Instead, the courts turned to separation of
powers principles as a legal justification for the dismissal of the
actions.36
Climate change is global, and fossil fuels contribute to climate
change and its resulting harms regardless of where they are
extracted and ultimately combusted; thus, the Plaintiffs in the
climate actions are seeking to hold multinational companies liable
under their state common law or – if the state common law claims
have been deemed federal common law claims – under U.S. federal
common law for fossil fuel extraction and combustion activities
that took place outside of the U.S. 37 The courts seem to rely on the
foreign aspect when invoking separation of powers to dismiss the
cities’ claims against foreign corporations.38 Purporting to follow a
string of recent Supreme Court cases,39 the courts reasoned that
the judiciary should not “extend or create private causes of action
even in the realm of domestic law,” for the “decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to legislative
judgment . . . .”40 Thus, the judiciary should be “wary of impinging
33. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp.
3d at 1024; see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011)
(“We hold that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from
fossil-fuel fired powerplants.”).
34. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425 (holding that the CAA “thus
provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic
powerplants”).
35. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (determining that “the Clean
Air Act regulates only domestic emissions”); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at
1024 (also determining that “foreign emissions are out of the EPA and Clean Air
Act’s reach”).
36. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 1025.
37. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp.
3d at 1026.
38. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp.
3d at 1026.
39. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
40. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (quoting Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at
1402).
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on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches,”41
and, as a result, “federal courts should exercise great caution
before fashioning federal common law in areas touching on foreign
affairs.”42 Thus, the courts, in less than a page of discussion, use
the extraterritorial effect of the cities’ claims as a means to dismiss
the cases on separation of powers grounds.43 The issue of the
extraterritorial application of the common law in the context of
climate nuisance suits, however, is quite difficult and nuanced,
warranting a more in-depth analysis. By analyzing the
jurisprudence surrounding extraterritoriality in conjunction with
the foundational principles of the common law, this Note argues
that the courts erred in determining that the extraterritorial
application of the common law in the context of climate nuisance
suits violates separation of powers principles.
III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
COMMON LAW

A. The Hesitation to Establish a New Field of Federal
Common Law
The district courts, when dismissing the climate nuisance
actions, relied on the principle that the judiciary must exercise
great caution before expanding the reach of the federal common
law.44 The trio of cases which give life to this principle, however,
involve interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).45 The ATS
has been described as a “legal Lohengrin,” in that its existence is
hard to trace.46 The creation of the ATS dates back to the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, whereby Congress included
a provision that bestowed upon the federal courts jurisdiction over
certain subject matters; thus, the ATS is merely a jurisdictional
41. Id. (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 727)).
42. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028.
43. See, e.g., City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76.
44. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124; see Jesner, 138 S.
Ct. at 1403.
45. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015
(2d Cir. 1975)).
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statute.47 In fact, during the first 170 years after the enactment of
the ATS, plaintiffs invoked its jurisdiction only once.48
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases relied upon by the district
courts all involve whether a cause of action is allowed under the
ATS.49 The first case, Sosa, produced a unanimous decision in
which the Court determined that the ATS does not create a private
right of action; rather, the statute merely provides a forum in
which foreign plaintiffs may seek redress. 50 Because the ATS had
only been invoked once previously,51 the Supreme Court proceeded
to conduct an in-depth historical analysis of the statute to identify
which causes of action could be brought under the ATS’s
jurisdiction.52 The Court ultimately found that the ATS “enabled
federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by
the law of nations and recognized at common law.”53 Thus, the
majority, echoed by Justice Scalia in concurrence, determined that
for a claim resting on a tort in violation of international law to be
valid under the ATS, the claim must (1) rest on a violation of
customary international law; and (2) be defined with specificity
comparable to violations of international law existing at the time
of the ATS’s enactment.54 Consequently, the Court interpreted the
ATS to limit the judiciary’s power in expanding the statute’s
jurisdictional scope.55
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court reiterated its
hesitance to allow judicial expansion of the ATS. 56 In Kiobel, the
plaintiffs, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the U.S.,
brought an action under the ATS against Dutch, British, and
Nigerian corporations for alleged violations of the law of nations.57
Unlike Sosa, where the Court grappled with whether the claim was
47. Id. at 712–13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 712; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394.
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
51. Id. at 712.
52. See id. at 712–38.
53. Id. at 712.
54. Id. at 725. This is commonly known as the Sosa test.
55. The door to litigation under the ATS has not been closed; rather, “the
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class
of international norms today.” Id. at 729.
56. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–16 (2013).
57. Id. at 111–12.
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valid under the ATS, in Kiobel, the question before the Court was
whether the ATS geographically reaches conduct that occurred in
another sovereign state.58 Simply put, the Court granted certiorari
to decide whether the ATS allowed federal courts to adjudicate
foreign conduct that occurred between aliens.59 Recognizing that
courts ultimately determine the geographic and jurisdictional
reach of the ATS, the Supreme Court utilized the presumption
against extraterritoriality – a canon of statutory interpretation
stating that a statute that fails to clearly indicate an
extraterritorial application has none60 – to conclude that the ATS’s
jurisdiction failed to encompass defendants’ violation of a law of
nations occurring in a sovereign outside the U.S.61 Because “the
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of
foreign policy is magnified . . . [where] the question is not what
Congress has done but instead what courts may do,” the Supreme
Court refused to expand the ATS’s jurisdiction in such a manner.62
In other words, in the context of the ATS, courts have the power to
interpret Congress’s delegation of jurisdiction to the judiciary,
specifically the geographic reach of ATS jurisdiction.63
Six years after the Supreme Court issued its Kiobel opinion,
the Court, in Jesner, again invoked judicial restraint, this time to
limit the availability of ATS causes of action that may implicate
foreign policy considerations.64 The petitioners invoked the
jurisdiction of the ATS, claiming that officials of a Jordanian bank
had allowed transfers of funds to terrorist groups, who then used
those funds to cause the deaths and injuries for which the plaintiffs

58. Id. at 115.
59. Michael L. Jones, Note, Domesticating the Alien Tort Statute, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 95, 106 (2016).
60. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (explaining that the
presumption assures that the “United States law governs domestically but does
not rule the world”).
61. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116 (“[w]e think the principles underlying the
canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action
that may be brought under the ATS.”); see also Jordan Clark, Note, Kiobel’s
Unintended Consequences: The Emergence of Transnational Litigation in State
Court, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 255 (2014).
62. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 109.
63. See id. at 116.
64. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407–08 (2018).
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sought compensation.65 The key issue in this case, left unanswered
in the Kiobel opinion, was whether the ATS’s jurisdiction
encompasses actions against foreign corporations.66 Utilizing
historical analyses, canons of statutory interpretation, and
rationales for judicial restraint employed in Sosa and Kiobel, the
Supreme Court, with a slim five-to-four advantage, concluded that
the ATS’s jurisdiction does not include claims brought against
foreign corporations.67
The trio of cases caution the judiciary against broadening the
jurisdictional scope of the ATS when interpreting the statute. 68
The district courts in the recent climate nuisance cases, however,
saw more than mere interpretations of the ATS. Instead, the
district courts determined that the trio illustrates a broader
cautionary tale against judicial action “in the face of ‘serious
foreign policy consequences.’”69 Specifically, the district courts
latched onto the language of and theory behind the Sosa, Kiobel,
and Jesner cases concerning extraterritorial application of U.S. law
to dismiss the common law climate actions.70 The courts opined
that because the essence of the nuisance claims derives from the
global emission of greenhouse gases and because this type of claim
implicates numerous sources of foreign authority, the
extraterritorial application of the common law would cause
“significant foreign relations implications,” which conflict with the
unequivocal warning expressed by Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner.71 The
district courts, however, failed to elaborate on one paramount
difference between the trilogy of cases and the climate nuisance
suits. Although the claims in Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner were
65. Id. at 1393.
66. Id. at 1395.
67. See generally id. Although the Jesner opinion was a plurality opinion, a
majority of Justices concluded that ATS jurisdiction does not reach to foreign
corporations.
68. It is important to note that the Supreme Court, in the trio of cases, was
not limiting the territoriality of the common law claims; rather, the Court merely
determined whether specific claims fall within the ATS’s jurisdictional
boundaries. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004); see Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 124; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407-08.
69. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(quoting Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407).
70. See e.g., City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117).
71. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
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common law claims, these claims arose under the specific
jurisdiction of the ATS, which is based on Congressional delegation
of jurisdiction to the judiciary.72 The climate nuisance suits, in
contrast, solely offer common law claims without any connection to
a statutory legal regime.73 Therefore, the courts ignored the stark
contrast between claims arising purely under the common law and
claims arising under statutory law.74
By failing to recognize that common law claims differ greatly
from their statutory counterparts, the courts incorrectly concluded
that the adjudication of climate nuisance suits would cause serious
foreign policy conflicts. The common law differs fundamentally
from statutory law and its extraterritorial application will not
produce the same foreign policy concerns.75 Long-standing,
foundational principles of the common law allow for the
extraterritorial application of the common law claims in the
context of climate nuisance suits without encroaching on the
powers of the political branches of government.
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does
Not Apply to Common Law Nuisance Suits
The presumption against extraterritoriality has existed in
American jurisprudence “for nearly as long as there have been
federal statutes.”76 Nevertheless, despite the waxing and waning
of this principle’s application and the changes in its definition, the
presumption has only been applied to the construction of
statutes.77 Instead of allowing judges to guess whether Congress
would allow for extraterritoriality in a certain context, the
presumption prevents “judicial-speculation-made-law” by only
allowing extraterritorial application when Congress unequivocally
72. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign
Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1833 (2018).
73. See, e.g., New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 68–73.
74. See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 1024–28.
75. See discussion infra Section III.B, IV.C.
76. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998).
77. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (citing
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“This principle represents a
canon of construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning, rather than a
limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.”).
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expresses an affirmative intention to give the statute
extraterritorial effect.78 Thus, the presumption prevents the
judiciary from expanding the reach of statutory law beyond the
legislative intent.
It has been suggested that the presumption against
extraterritoriality derives from a policy of preventing judicial
interference with foreign affairs through court-made geographic
extensions of U.S. law. 79 In fact, it is this argument that the
district courts relied on in applying the presumption to common
law nuisance claims.80 In the City of Oakland, the court applied a
heightened level of caution which paralleled that of Kiobel.81 The
Supreme Court in Kiobel determined that judicial interference is
more dangerous when the courts are deciding what they may do.82
This danger, however, relates to the judiciary’s role under the ATS
to determine the jurisdictional reach of the statute. In Sosa, Kiobel,
and Jesner, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining
whether the substantive claims at issue were subject to ATS
jurisdiction.83 With jurisdictional statutes such as the ATS, the
court retains the ability to significantly expand or limit the
substantive reach of the statute. Thus, the courts reason that
caution is warranted to prevent judicial overreach.
Some scholars, although agreeing that the extraterritorial
application of statutes will cause judicial interference in the realm
of foreign policy, disagree that the common law must be similarly
restricted.84 Specifically, because the common law represents a
fundamentally unique form of law, one which has key distinctions
from its statutory counterpart, its extraterritorial application will
not cause similar concerns.85

78. Id. at 261.
79. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1303, 1351 (2014).
80. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
81. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025.
82. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116
(2013)).
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at
112–13; Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018).
84. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law
Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301, 335 (2014).
85. Id.
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1. The Common Law as “Common,” “Constrained”
and the Law of the “Commoner”
When rejecting application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality to judge-made common law, then-professor
Jeffrey Meyer illustrated three key distinctions between the
common law and its statutory counterpart.86 Namely, the common
law is “common,” “constrained,” and the law of the “commoner.”87
In other words, the common law applies principles which
transcend geographic boundaries, is derived from the “customs and
relations of the common people, rather than being legislatively
ordained,” and, is “subject to long-established practices” that
systemically restrain its change more than statutes. 88 Already,
multiple courts have rejected attempts to limit the geographic
reach of common law principles abroad.89
Tort law has long been applied in the extraterritorial context
due to its “common” nature. Justice Holmes acknowledged this
possibility by stating that “[g]enerally speaking, as between two
common-law countries, the common law of one reasonably may be
presumed to be what it is decided to be in the other, in a case tried
in the latter state,” while “a statute of one would not be presumed
to correspond to a statute in the other . . . .”90 Even for noncommon law countries, “[t]here is every reason why [other
countries] should be presumed to recognize fundamental principles
of right and wrong which lie at the foundation of human society,”

86. In 2014, Professor Meyer was appointed to the U.S. District Court of
Connecticut. Ana Radelat, Senate Confirms Meyer for District Court, CT MIRROR
(Feb. 24, 2014), https://ctmirror.org/2014/02/24/senate-confirms-meyer-fordistrict-court/ [https://perma.cc/M3JY-GHZ7].
87. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Jovic v. L–3 Servs., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 750, 762–64 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (determining that the common law can be applied even if the conduct
occurred outside of the state that accepts such common law principles); see also
Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Blavatnik, No. 650591/11, 2015 WL 5057693, at *23
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015) (“New York courts have historically found that there
is no territorial limit to New York common law causes of action, as there is with
federal and state statutes.”). Additionally, two recent courts declined to apply the
presumption to common law claims because the Defendants failed to cite
authority supporting the application. See Armada (Singapore) Pte Ltd. v. Amcol
Int’l Corp., 244 F. Supp. 3d 750, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Leibman v. Prupes, No. 2:14CV-09003, 2015 WL 3823954, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015).
90. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912).
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so that “if one should sue for damages suffered from an assault and
battery, or from a larceny committed” in a foreign country, then
“[t]here ought to be a presumption from common knowledge that a
liability exists everywhere in such cases.”91 Thus, when “common”
principles lay the foundation for the common law, courts need not
hesitate to apply it extraterritorially.92
Additionally, unlike statutory law, common law is
“constrained” by the past.93 Although many legal realists see the
common law as judge-made law which parallels the legislative
process, common law judges operate quite differently.94 Instead of
enacting broad policy like legislators, common law judges are
constrained to specific dispute resolution.95 The common law
depends upon “conformity with the past” and what is “transmitted
through time as a received body of knowledge and learning.”96
91. Parrot v. Mex. Cent. Ry. Co., 93 N.E. 590, 593 (Mass. 1911); see also Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1839) (“The common law is said to be
‘common right’. . . . In all civilized nations, this law is substantially the same.
Even in nations not admitted to be within that description, there is a strong
resemblance: for example, in the laws of the Hindoos. The reason is obvious.
Whether expounded in codes, or disclosed by judicial investigation and decision,
the great principles of justice are identical; and it is the aim of all law to cultivate,
extend, and enforce them. Statutes are but few in comparison. They are
exceptions; the common law is the great body. The legislator acts chiefly upon
matters which are indifferent.”).
92. See Meyer, supra note 84, at 340. In response to Professor Meyer’s article,
some critics have pointed to numerous examples wherein conflicts of similar
common law principles still arise. See Zachary D. Clopton & P. Bartholomew
Quintans, Extraterritoriality and Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Response
to Professor Meyer, 102 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 28, 29–30 (2013) (citing BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 107–10 (1963)). Obviously,
these situations may occur, but, in the vast majority, the multiple common laws
do not conflict and are thus “common.”
93. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307.
94. Id. at 342–43.
95. Id. at 343; see also Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law
Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 593 (2006) (“Common law judges of earlier eras
themselves reinterpreted received precedents with an eye toward their own
situations . . . .”).
96. Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY
AND COMMON LAW 8, 20 (William Twining ed., 1986). Instead of the top-down
approach of legislators, the common law derives bottom-up from long-established
customs and principles. See COMMON LAW THEORY 173 (Douglas E. Edlin ed.,
2007) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
68–70 (Oxford Uni. Press, 1765)) (“[T]he root of common law . . . was ancient
custom, custom so long established that ‘the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary.’”)).
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Simply put, statutory law reflects a majoritarian model whereby a
simple majority of legislators is required to define the law,97 while
common law reaches beyond the majoritarian outlook to include
the traditions of the minority when determining the law.98
Also, the common law is not an expression of legislative
intent.99 Rather, it arose independent of geographic considerations
and political figures to reflect people’s relationships with one
another.100 As such, the common law system evolved into:
[A] customary system of law in this sense, that it consists of a body
of practices observed and ideas received over time by a caste of
lawyers, these ideas being used by them as providing guidance in
what is conceived to be the rational determination of disputes
litigated before them, or by them on behalf of clients, and in other
contexts.101

It was Chief Justice John Marshall who stated that “[w]hen our
ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the
common law of their native country,” and “[i]n breaking our
political connection with the parent state, we did not break our
connection with each other.”102 And so the common law can be

97. See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 409, 419–420 (1999).
98. See id. at 440.
99. “[T]he ‘commonsense notion [is] that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind.’” Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005)
(quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
100. See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (U.C. Press,
1995) (explaining the origins of the common law as a framework of interactions
designed to meet common goals without political discourse); Meyer, supra note
84, at 342.
101. Simpson, supra note 96, at 20.
102. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811). In further
support of this notion, carved onto the external walls of the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. is the quote “[t]he common law derives from the will of
mankind, issuing from the life of the people, framed by mutual confidence, and
sanctioned by the light of reason.” See Robert Farley, Chain E-mail Claims a
Quote at the Top of the Redesigned Department of Justice Website Comes from a
Socialist Who Wanted to Impose Global Common Law, POLITIFACT (July 14, 2011),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/jul/14/chainemail/chain-e-mail-claims-quote-top-redesigned-departmen/
[https://perma.cc/G5XJ-LAZB?type=image] (explaining the location and the
history of the quotation).

17

194

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

deemed the law of the “commoner” because it is derived from the
relationships amongst the people sans geographic limitations.103
2. Climate Nuisance Suits as “Common,”
“Constrained,” and the Law of the “Commoner”
The district courts in City of Oakland and City of New York
were correct when stating that courts should be wary of extending
the common law beyond its intended reach. This restraint,
however, should not derive from a fear of foreign affairs
implications caused by extraterritoriality; rather, the caution
should arise only where there is a deviation from longstanding
foundations of the common law. Because nuisance suits relating to
climate change embody the three unique characteristics of the
common law, such suits are distinguishable from statutory claims
made under the ATS, and therefore the courts should be permitted
to adjudicate these suits in the extraterritorial context. The tort of
nuisance is “common” because in relevant international
jurisdictions, it has been recognized as a valid claim. In both
climate nuisance suits, the cities brought actions against Royal
Dutch Shell and BP, companies headquartered in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, respectively.104 In the United Kingdom,
nuisance law has been used for hundreds of years as a means for
the protection of property rights, including in the transnational
context.105 In the Netherlands, nuisance law has been utilized for
the same purpose.106 Thus, the potential for foreign affairs
implications in these climate nuisance suits as voiced by the
district courts107 is misguided due to the commonality of nuisance
suits between these sovereign states.
103. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307.
104. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 8–9.
105. See Elena Merino Blanco & Ben Pontin, Litigating Extraterritorial
Nuisances Under English Common Law and UK Statute, 6 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L.
285, 285 (2016).
106. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der
Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) [hereinafter
Urgenda Decision].
107. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(“To litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in
federal court would severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are
squarely within the purview of the political branches of the U.S. Government.”);
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1029 (N.D. Cal 2018) (“The
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The locality of harm alleged by the cities illustrates the
“constrained” aspect of climate nuisance suits. The cities are trying
neither to regulate the world’s greenhouse gas emissions nor to
chastise the burning of fossil fuels to harness necessary forms of
energy and electricity. Instead, the cities are attempting to obtain
monetary relief for the damages caused to their municipal regions
because of the activities of the oil companies.108 Thus, the courts
must not view these adjudications as ones which will send
shockwaves throughout U.S. foreign policy; rather, the courts must
view the claims as what they are – claims for relief for the damages
caused by interference of rights common to the general public of
those municipalities.109 The district courts reasoned that because
climate nuisance suits will involve the balancing of competing
interests – namely, the balance between environmental protection
and the continued use of fossil fuels as a source of energy – this
balancing should be left to Congress.110 Even though most
nuisance suits involve the balancing of interests,111 which is a form
of policymaking, in the context of climate nuisance suits,
completion of a nuisance analysis may not require such
balancing.112 Therefore, the fact that climate nuisance suits
problem [of climate change] deserves a solution on a more vast scale than can be
supplied by a district judge or jury in a public nuisance case.”).
108. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 73–74; Oakland Am. Compl.,
supra note 18, at 55.
109. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 22, at 354 (explaining how the “nihilistic
judge” abdicates their duty in the face of a grand and complex nature of the
problem). The relevant inquiry is whether the statute should apply domestically,
which requires the determination of the statute’s focus. WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136–37 (2018) (alterations omitted) (quoting
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016), and Morrison
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)).
110. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 1027.
111. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A–F (AM. LAW
INST. 1979).
112. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 369–71 (2d Cir.
2011), rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (determining that the City of
New York pleaded a valid public nuisance claim for damages caused by climate
change). In addition, the Restatement has included a non-balancing test, referred
to as the “moral outrage” test, whereby an invasion is unreasonable if the harm
it causes is “severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without
compensation.” ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 78 (8th ed. 2018) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 829A).
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present the possibility for a larger, more impactful decision should
not suppress a court’s ability to hear the matter. Even so,
adjudication in this context does not necessarily involve the
balancing of environmental protection and fossil fuel energy;
rather, it presents the fossil fuel industry’s crippling effects on
coastal cities.113 The cities are not seeking to end the use of fossil
fuels or promote worldwide environmental protection with these
suits. Instead, these suits seek reimbursement for the millions of
dollars spent repairing the damages caused by climate change.114
Therefore, despite the assumption that these suits involve the
immense policy decision of balancing environmental protection
with continued fossil fuel use, these suits actually represent a
constrained action to recover localized damages. Additionally,
these claims do not present novel arguments for which there is no
precedent. Nuisance claims have long been used as a means to
address localized harm to the enjoyment of private or public
property.115 Therefore, the use of judicial restraint to bar valid and
justifiable climate nuisance claims stands without merit.116
Instead, it reflects the current trend of the judiciary to dismiss
valid claims associated with climate change without reviewing the
merits.117
Climate nuisance suits represent the law of the “commoner”
despite the relatively new nature of climate change. Nuisance
claims purport to protect an individual’s right to use and enjoy her
property or to protect rights common to the general public.118 In
the context of climate nuisance suits, the property of municipalities
113. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 32–34; Oakland Am.
Compl., supra note 18, at 45–50.
Additionally, the claims are intertwined with the fact that the energy companies
misrepresented the causes and impacts of climate change to the public. See James
Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 342, 342–45 (2018).
114. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 73–74; Oakland Am. Compl.,
supra note 18, at 55.
115. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 244–45 (1901) (public
nuisance); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666
(Tenn. 1904) (private nuisance).
116. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321–32 (determining that although
common law climate actions present difficult and complex questions, the court
must not yield because of this difficulty).
117. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 22, at 322–23.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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have been destroyed or significantly damaged because of humancreated climate change.119 Although climate change may appear
massive in scale, the root of the cities’ claims derive from localized
harms allegedly caused by private parties. Nuisance suits are
notorious for varying in scale, from claims as small as a neighbor
damaging a homeowner’s trees120 to more sizeable claims such as
the contamination of large cities’ drinking water supply. 121 What
remains constant throughout every suit, however, is the localized
relationship between the individual and the harm.122 People and
communities have utilized the foundations of nuisance law to
protect their property interest for hundreds of years. Thus,
nuisance suits, even when applied on the grand scale of climate
change, must be viewed as the law of the “commoner.” And
although climate nuisance suits are grand in scale, the courts must
not shy away from adjudicating valid claims on cautionary
grounds.
The “common,” “constrained,” and “commoner” characteristics
of climate nuisance suits illustrate why the district courts’
application of the judicial caution laid out in Sosa, Kiobel, and
Jesner cannot apply. Rather, the courts should have understood
that the U.S. common law can be extended extraterritorially.123
119. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 23; Oakland Am. Compl., supra
note 18, at 45–51.
120. Stevens v. Moon, 202 P. 961, 962 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
121. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901).
122. The distinction between ATS litigation and common law climate
nuisance suits is further supported by the fact that suits arising under the ATS
often involve foreign parties, conduct in foreign jurisdictions, and harms
experienced outside of the US. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 720 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 123 (2013);
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018). In contrast, the common
law climate actions here involve local harm and local plaintiffs.
123. Another key factor to consider when analyzing whether the common law
can apply abroad is Due Process constraints. In All State Ins., Co. v. Hague, the
Supreme Court determined, with respect to the extraterritoriality of state law,
the Due Process Clause prevents state courts from applying common law claims
in the absence of any “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.” 449
U.S. 302, 308 (1981). In the common law climate actions, however, this
requirement is easily satisfied because both foreign oil companies regularly do
business within California and New York. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18,
at 10–16; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 11–25. The District courts, in
lieu of analyzing these clearly satisfied Due Process requirements, apply the
arguably more appropriate limits on extraterritoriality. City of New York v. BP
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Instead of invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality
and prematurely dismissing these claims, the district courts
should have proceeded to perform a choice-of-law analysis to
determine the applicability of U.S. law. Although the choice-of-law
analysis appears separate and disconnected from the viability of
applying the common law extraterritorially, performing the choiceof-law analysis highlights certain aspects of the climate nuisance
actions which further support the extraterritorial application of
the common law in such suits.
IV.

CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES DICTATE THE
USE OF U.S. LAW IN CLIMATE NUISANCE
SUITS

Instead of invoking extraterritoriality to dismiss the climate
nuisance suits, state and federal district courts should proceed to
employ choice-of-law rules and traditional common law principles
to determine the source and content of the legal rights and
obligations implicated by overseas conduct that causes domestic
harm to U.S. residents. 124 Because the district courts’
determination to apply federal common law is currently pending
on appeal and may be reversed,125 the following section discusses
how choice-of-law principles dictate the utilization of U.S. law in
the context of both federal and state common law.
A. Federal Common Law
When claims arising under the federal common law conflict
with another body of law, federal courts in general apply the law
of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation.126
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal 2018).
124. See, e.g., Ajuba Int’l, LLC v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 681 (E.D.
Mich. 2012) (tortious conduct committed in foreign country caused harm in
Michigan and was actionable under Michigan tort law); In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 994–95 (2d Cir. 1980) (state tort law
applies to claims brought by Vietnam War veterans injured by wartime use of
chemical herbicides).
125. Appellate Brief, supra note 30; see also Appellant Brief, City of Oakland
v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2019).
126. Eli Lilly do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir.
1992)) [hereinafter “Eli Lilly”].
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This regularly involves the employment of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.127 Under the Restatement, where
actions involve injury to property, “the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship . . . .”128 The Restatement
outlines seven factors to analyze when determining if a forum has
a “more significant relationship” than the forum where the injury
occurred:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.129

Factors (d), (e), and (f), however, are of lesser importance in the
field of torts, because “persons who cause injury on nonprivileged
occasions, particularly when the injury is unintentionally caused,
usually act without giving thought to the law that may be applied
to determine the legal consequences of this conduct.”130 These
parties retain low justified expectations with respect to choice-oflaw principles, so the protection of these expectations play only a
minute role in a choice-of-law analysis.131 Consequently, the
remaining factors – (a), (b), (c), and (g) –become more significant in
the analysis.132 Special weight, however, is given to subsection (a)
– the needs of the interstate and international systems – where the
issue would be resolved differently under laws of each interested
state.133
127. See e.g., id. at 81; In re Sterba, 852 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2017).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (AM. LAW INST.
1971); see also Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003–04 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting that the Restatement “creates a presumption that the law of the
place where the injury occurred applies”).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).
130. Id. at § 145 cmt. b.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 145 cmt. d.
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1. Maintaining the International System
One concern with allowing U.S. law to govern is the possibility
that “[h]uge United States tort judgments could trigger similar
adverse foreign reactions because the judgment could bankrupt or
financially cripple the foreign defendant and, in some cases,
undercut employment and the economy of the foreign country.”134
But when a foreign entity engages in commercial activity with the
purpose of deriving substantial profits from the U.S. market, it
arguably assumes the risk of having U.S. law applied to tortious
conduct that caused injury to the country.135 In the current climate
proceedings, both Royal Dutch Shell and BP perform substantial
business within both California and New York, including the
production, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels.136 Therefore, even
though these oil companies are headquartered abroad, the
presence of numerous contacts within California and New York
suggest that the international systems will remain intact with the
application of U.S. law over that of the foreign nations.
The maintenance of the international system is further
supported by the European Union’s (“E.U.”) Rome II Regulation.137
An important consideration for the first factor explores whether
the foreign forum’s choice-of-law analysis differs from that of the
local forum because the needs of the interstate system may become
imbalanced through the utilization of the local forum’s laws. 138 For
E.U. member states, including the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and
the Netherlands,139 the Rome II Regulation provides that “the law
134. Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and
International Policies in Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second
Restatement and Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465,
2480 (1996).
135. Id. at 2482.
136. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 10–13, 19–22; Oakland Am.
Compl., supra note 18, at 11–12, 21–23.
137. See Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II),
2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II Regulation].
138. See e.g., Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.
1987) (“Choosing Poland’s damages law facilitates the working of the
international system because Poland would apply the same law under its choiceof-law rule, lex loci delicti.”).
139. Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea
[https://perma.cc/5R58-L45J]. Although the U.K. has attempted unsuccessfully to
leave the E.U. numerous times, because its withdrawal appears nonexistent in
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applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a
tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage
occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to
the damage occurred . . . .”140 Although not applicable to the U.S.,
the Rome II regulation is some evidence that the E.U. accepts the
traditional application of an injured forum’s law, suggesting that
the E.U. does not have a strong interest in applying a contrary rule.
Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of utilizing U.S. law in
the context of climate nuisance actions.
2. Relevant Policies and Interests of Each
Sovereign Nation
In determining the extent of each parties’ interest in tort
actions, courts have employed a three-step analysis: (1) identify the
particular rule of law in each state, (2) identify the purposes or
policies underlying each rule, and (3) assess the extent to which
application of each rule in the current context will further such
policy.141 The U.S. and U.K. nuisance laws are nearly identical in
language and structure, essentially both revolve around the
protection of a state’s people from localized property
interference.142 And because the U.S. nuisance law developed from
its U.K. counterpart,143 the purposes of each can be fairly equated.
This is further supported by the main consideration of reviewing
each parties’ interests, which allows courts to scrutinize conflicting
laws when one law absolves an individual of liability while the
the near future, it is quite likely that the adjudications of the climate nuisance
actions will be completed beforehand.
140. Rome II Regulation, supra note 137, at 44–45 (“The law applicable to a
non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental damage or damage
sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law
determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for
damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the
event giving rise to the damage occurred.”).
141. See, e.g., Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999).
142. See The Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public
Nuisance
and
Outraging
Public
Decency, at
5,
COM
(2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file
[https://perma.cc/6DBK-UECN] [hereinafter The Law
Commission].
143. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox
of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755, 767 (2001).
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other imposes liability.144 In the current climate nuisance actions,
with respect to the conflict between U.S. and U.K. law, there is no
such dichotomy; rather, each jurisdiction employs a multi-factored
analysis to determine whether the alleged nuisance is
actionable.145
The conflict between U.S. and Dutch law is not as clear-cut.
Because the Netherlands does not possess a comprehensive
nuisance law framework that parallels that of the U.S., 146 a quick
comparative analysis appears unattainable. However, the
Netherlands, through its judiciary, has recently mandated a
policy-shift towards fewer greenhouse gas emissions because
climate change is currently, and will continue to negatively impact,
numerous local interests of the Dutch people.147 Therefore,
applying the U.S. law in the current climate actions will not cause
conflicts with the Dutch policy because the nature of the climate
nuisance suits is to allow recovery for localized harms caused by
the production, marketing, and sale of the fossil fuels which
produce greenhouse gases. Consequently, this factor does not
weigh in favor of applying U.K. or Dutch law when adjudicating
the current climate actions.
3. Ease in Applying U.S. Law
It has long been accepted that there is a risk of courts
misapplying unfamiliar law.148 Even though U.K. nuisance law
has a similar framework to U.S. nuisance law, U.S. courts will still
be required to comprehend and correctly apply foreign law, which
still imposes some risk of misapplication. With respect to Dutch
law, the risk is significantly magnified because the Netherlands
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see
The Law Commission, supra note 142, at 6–7.
146. See generally Art. 6:178 para. f BW. (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil
Code:
Book
6
The
Law
of
Obligations,
DUTCHCIVILLAW.COM,
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle6633.htm
[https://perma.cc/8KPY-VXWP] [hereinafter Dutch Civil Code].
147. Urgenda Decision, supra note 106, at 50 ¶4.89 (upholding the lower
court’s reasoning expressly grounded in the Dutch law of hazardous negligence).
148. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 745–49 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (determining that a Kansas court incorrectly applied
the laws of another state).
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does not have a public nuisance framework. Consequently, even
though California and New York brought their claims under the
public nuisance doctrines, applying Dutch law would require the
courts to divert from the familiar common law framework to one of
civil law. The potential for misapplication illustrates the difficulty
of applying foreign law and highlights the ease of applying U.S.
law. With all relevant factors overwhelmingly weighing in favor of
applying U.S. law, the federal common law, as opposed to U.K. and
Dutch law, must govern.
B. State Common Law
When federal courts sit in diversity, however, they must
conform to the conflict of law principles prevailing in the state.149
Because there are currently two climate nuisance suits attempting
to apply state law – in California and New York – and because each
state utilizes a unique choice-of-law framework, this section
analyzes both states.
1. California
“California courts employ a ‘governmental interest analysis’ to
assess whether California law or non-forum law should
apply. . . .”150 The governmental interest analysis comprises three
general steps: (1) determine whether the laws of the conflicting
forums actually differ from one another; (2) if there is a difference,
examine each jurisdiction’s interest in applying its law to
determine if a conflict truly exists; and, (3) if there is a true conflict,
“carefully evaluate[] the nature and strength” of each jurisdiction’s
interest in the application of its own law “‘to determine which
state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were
subordinated to the policy of the other state’ and then ultimately

149. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A federal court
sitting in diversity or adjudicating state law claims that are pendent to a federal
claim must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state.”); Moore v. Greene,
431 F.2d 584, 589–90 (9th Cir. 1970) (same).
150. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009); Reich v.
Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (“[W]hen application of the law of the place
of the wrong would defeat the interests of the litigants and of the states concerned,
we have not applied that law.”).
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appl[y] ‘the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired
if its law were not applied.’”151
In California, the state essentially follows the Restatement
(Second) of Torts with respect to public nuisance.152 Public
nuisance is described as a substantial and unreasonable
interference to collective social interests, including “‘the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the
public convenience.’”153 The requirements of a substantial and
unreasonable interference can be further explained. First, a
“substantial” interference is one that causes “significant harm,”
defined as “harm of importance . . . a real and appreciable invasion
of the plaintiff’s interests . . . and an invasion that is definitely
offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable.”154 This element is
governed by an objective standard, following what “persons of
normal health and sensibilities living in the same community”
would believe.155 Second, to determine if an interference is
“unreasonable,” the reviewing court examines “whether the
gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s
conduct, [by] taking a number of factors into account.”156 This
determination is likewise an objective one, which is typically
decided by the factfinders in a specific case.157
In the U.K., public nuisance is nearly identical in nature.
Similar to its U.S. counterpart, U.K. law characterizes public
nuisance as “‘suffering of common injury by members of the public
by interference with rights enjoyed by them as such.’”158 Although
the language of the U.K. public nuisance doctrine does not
perfectly mirror that of California’s public nuisance doctrine, it can
still be considered “the same” with respect to the choice-of-law

151. McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC., 225 P.3d 516, 527 (Cal. 2010) (quoting
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006)).
152. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604–05 (Cal. 1997).
153. Id. at 604.
154. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal.
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
155. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 88 (5th ed. 1984)).
156. Id. at 697 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826–831 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977)).
157. Id.
158. The Law Commission, supra note 142, at 5.
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analysis.159 Therefore, because the U.K. law and California both
define public nuisance as an interference with a right common to
the general public, there is no conflict and California law
governs.160
In the Netherlands, there is no specific public nuisance
doctrine which parallels that in California.161 Consequently, the
laws of the U.S. cannot be identical to those of the Netherlands,
forcing a reviewing court to move to the second criterion: examine
each jurisdiction’s interest in applying its law to determine if a
conflict truly exists. First and foremost, although Royal Dutch
Shell is headquartered in the Netherlands, it performs vast
activities within U.S. boundaries, including selling, producing, and
marketing fossil fuels as well as pouring millions of dollars into
lobbying campaigns.162 In California, more interactions with a
certain forum translates to that forum having a larger interest in
the matter.163 Not only was California the location of the harm, but
California was also home to numerous Royal Dutch Shell
operations.
Additionally, in the Netherlands, modern policy has trended
towards the minimization of fossil fuels to abate the effects of
climate change by reducing carbon emissions and to adapt to the
already changing climate.164 Consequently, allowing the localized
159. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
because the law of the foreign forum generally does not conflict with the current
forum, there is no conflict under California’s choice of law analysis).
160. This further supports the argument that extraterritoriality should not
be an issue in the context of common law climate nuisance suits. See discussion
infra Section IV.C.
161. See Dutch Civil Code, supra note 146.
162. Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 9, 21; Niall McCarthy, Oil and
Gas Giants Spend Millions Lobbying to Block Climate Change Policies
[Infographic],
FORBES
(Mar.
25,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spendmillions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policiesinfographic/?fbclid=IwAR31OeH2e6q6SvCF_fglBQnZqMFbZVtowmq5MvOBSXbsI7sBEm2cbaM-gw#1a82fa987c4f
[https://perma.cc/6X68-3Z4H].
163. See Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Delaware’s interest in regulating the activities of
its domestic corporations is less substantial where, as here, its only contact with
the corporation is in issuing a certificate of incorporation.”).
164. See Dutch Vision on Global Climate Action, GOV’T.NL,
https://www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/dutch-vision-on-globalclimate-action [https://perma.cc/37PR-5CST].
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recovery in the California climate nuisance action will not impair
the climate-friendly policies of the Netherlands.165 Thus, if state
law governs in the context of the recent climate nuisance actions,
California’s choice-of-law framework dictates the utilization of
California state law.
2. New York
New York has adopted a “greater interest” analysis whereby
the law of the jurisdiction which has the “greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation[]” applies.166 To determine
which law controls under this standard, the reviewing court must
evaluate each jurisdiction’s relationship or contact with the
occurrence of events or the parties.167
New York, like California, follows the Restatement of Torts
and defines a public nuisance as “conduct . . . which offend[s],
interfere[s] with or cause[s] damage to the public in the exercise of
rights common to all.”168 Consequently, New York nuisance law is
nearly identical to the nuisance law of the U.K..169 With respect to
the Netherlands, however, the nuisance laws do not match because
the Netherlands does not have a specific nuisance doctrine.170 This
difference does not matter, though, because in cases involving the
interference with property rights, the New York Court of Appeals
has determined it “almost unthinkable” to apply the law of some
other location than the law where the property is located.171
The logic is simple in the climate nuisance context: New York
has experienced significant damages as a result of oil companies’
165. See Havlicek, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700 (referencing the consideration
given to each state’s interest in the application of its respective policies).
166. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)).
167. Id.
168. Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y.
1977).
169. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Dutch Civil Code, supra note 146. This is further
supported by the analysis performed in the Urgenda Decision whereby the court
did not invoke a nuisance doctrine but instead utilized other fields of law to
protect public rights injured by greenhouse gas emissions. See Urgenda Decision,
supra note 106.
171. Heaney v. Purdy, 272 N.E.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. 1971) (quoting Babcock,
191 N.E.2d at 284).
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contribution to climate change. The houses, schools, hospitals, and
livelihoods of the New York population have been put at serious
risk because of the actions of the oil companies. Consequently, the
city has expended mass amounts of funds to prevent any rapid
deterioration. Therefore, New York must have a greater interest in
the matter than the countries located thousands of miles away
from the localized harms, and New York law must apply to the
climate nuisance suit brought in the Southern District.
C. The Choice-of-Law Analyses Further Support the
Extraterritorial Application of the Common Law in
Climate Actions.
Even though the current procedural posture of the climate
actions involves the determination of whether the federal common
law or the respective state common law applies, 172 in either
situation, choice-of-law principles dictate the use of U.S. law.173
This determination, although typically considered after
justiciability analyses,174 shines relevant light on whether
allowing the extraterritoriality of the common law in climate
actions violates separation of powers principles.
With respect to the British corporation BP, federal, California,
and New York public nuisance law does not present a conflict with
its U.K. counterpart.175 Logically, the district courts’ broad
generalization that the extraterritorial application of the common
law creates “serious foreign policy consequences” is unfounded.176
Even with respect to the Royal Dutch Shell where a more
traditional conflict of laws arises, the volume and depth of interests
felt by the U.S. and its respective states overwhelm the minority of
172. Although this determination will affect the justiciability of the climate
actions against foreign oil companies, the main purpose of appealing this issue is
to prevent the Clean Air Act’s preemption of the federal common law. See
Appellant Brief, supra note 30, at 43–47; Brief for Appellants at 34–42, City of
Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2019).
173. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B.
174. See, e.g., Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 174–80 (3d
Cir. 1995) (performing a choice of law analysis after determining that the court
had subject matter jurisdiction); Floyd v. CIBC World Mkts., Inc., 426 B.R. 622,
633–641 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (performing a choice of law analysis after determining
that the parties had proper standing).
175. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B.
176. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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interests of the Netherlands.177 Coupled with the intense climate
mitigation and adaptation efforts pursued by the Netherlands,178
the presence of “serious foreign policy consequences” appears
inapposite. In the context of climate nuisance actions, then, the
district courts’ omission of a choice-of-law analysis caused the
courts to overstate the relevant foreign policy concerns and to
invoke inapt Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, in addition to
determining that U.S. law governs in common law climate
nuisance actions, the choice-of-law analysis further supports the
extraterritorial application of the common law.
V.

CONCLUSION

More and more, municipalities are turning to the common law
in search of remedies for the damages caused by climate change.
Judges are consistently dismissing these actions, often by offering
less than convincing reasons as to why these actions cannot
proceed on the merits. The district courts’ findings in the City of
New York and the City of Oakland cases demonstrate the most
recent attack on allowing the adjudication of climate actions on
their merits. The utilization of the statutory presumption against
extraterritoriality to bar the common law’s reach to foreign oil
companies, however, stands on shaky grounds due to the common
law’s significant variation from its statutory counterpart. As this
Note has illustrated, the U.S. district courts’ reliance on Supreme
Court precedent involving statutory law plays no role in the
extraterritorial application of the common law.
This Note goes a step further in completing the final analysis
before reaching the merits of the case – determining which law
applies. By reviewing the choice-of-law principles in conjunction
with U.S. law, U.K. law, and Dutch law, the mandate to apply U.S.
law further supports the extraterritorial application of the common
law because it demonstrates the lack of conflicting laws and
policies between the three sovereign nations. Because issues of

177. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B.
178. See Dutch Vision on Global Climate Action, supra note 164.
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standing179 and political question180 in the context of climate suits
have already been resolved, the choice-of-law analysis represents
the final jurisdictional hurdle the district courts must overcome
before reviewing the cities’ claims against the foreign oil companies
on the merits. By understanding that in the context of common law
climate actions U.S. law – whether federal or state – applies, there
is a stronger likelihood of the judiciary overcoming jurisdictional
hurdles to decide the merits of these cases. The judiciary’s
reticence to hear common law climate actions is concerning
because the most significant effects of climate change have yet to
come and the current global efforts to prevent such effects appear
inadequate.

179. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (determining that
governmental entities have standing with respect to damages caused by climate
change).
180. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2011),
rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (determining that although common
law climate actions present difficult and complex questions, the suits do not
present a nonjusticiable political question).

33

